Prospect theory in the health domain: A quantitative assessment by Attema, Arthur E. et al.
Prospect theory in the health domain: A quantitative
assessment
Arthur E. Attema, Werner B.F. Brouwer, Olivier L’haridon
To cite this version:
Arthur E. Attema, Werner B.F. Brouwer, Olivier L’haridon. Prospect theory in the health
domain: A quantitative assessment. Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, 2013, 32 (6),
pp.1057-1065. <10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.08.006>. <halshs-00866788>
HAL Id: halshs-00866788
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00866788
Submitted on 14 Oct 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Prospect theory in the health domain: A quantitative 
assessment1 
 
 
Arthur E. Attemaa, Werner B.F. Brouwerb and Olivier l’Haridonc 
 
 
a
 (Corresponding author) iBMG/iMTA, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: attema@bmg.eur.nl, --31-10.408.91.29 (O); --31-
10.408.90.81 (F) 
b
 iBMG/iMTA, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
E-mail: brouwer@bmg.eur.nl 
c
 Crem-University Rennes 1 and Greghec, HEC Paris. 
 
 
August, 2013 
 
                                               
1
 We are grateful to Laurens Niëns and Matthijs Versteegh for advice on the experimental design. Mohammed 
Abdellaoui, Aurélien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt and Peter Wakker gave helpful comments on a previous version 
of this manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 2
ABSTRACT 
 
It is well-known that expected utility (EU) has empirical deficiencies. Cumulative prospect theory 
(CPT) has developed as an alternative with more descriptive validity. However, CPT’s full function 
had not yet been quantified in the health domain. This paper is therefore the first to simultaneously 
measure utility of life duration, probability weighting, and loss aversion in this domain. 
 We observe loss aversion and risk aversion for gains and losses, which for gains can be explained 
by probabilistic pessimism. Utility for gains is almost linear. For losses, we find less weighting of 
probability 1/2 and concave utility. This contrasts with the common finding of convex utility for 
monetary losses. However, CPT was proposed to explain choices among lotteries involving monetary 
outcomes. Life years are arguably very different from monetary outcomes and need not generate 
convex utility for losses. Moreover, utility of life duration reflects discounting, causing concave 
utility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Health economic evaluations are increasingly used by policy makers to help allocate scarce health 
care resources. These evaluations often entail cost-utility analyses, where health benefits are 
expressed in terms of utility. The common utility model used is the Quality-Adjusted Life-Years 
(QALY) model (Pliskin et al., 1980), which is based upon expected utility (EU) theory. However, 
many descriptive violations of EU have been reported during the last decades (Starmer, 2000), 
including in the field of health economics (Bleichrodt et al., 2007; Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982; 
Treadwell and Lenert, 1999). This puts into question the empirical validity of the QALY model in its 
present form. 
 Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) has developed as an important 
alternative, with more descriptive validity. CPT’s main deviations from EU are its reliance on a 
reference point (RP), a nonlinear transformation of probabilities into decision weights (probability 
weighting), and a higher sensitivity to losses than to gains as seen from this RP (loss aversion). Much 
research has been done to measure utility and/or probability weighting under CPT, both for monetary 
outcomes (Abdellaoui, 2000; Fehr-Duda et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; van de Kuilen 
and Wakker, 2011; Wu and Gonzalez, 1999) and for health outcomes (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; 
Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989; Verhoef et al., 1994), but quantifications of loss aversion have been less 
widespread. Only recently, a number of studies have proposed and implemented methods to measure 
indices of loss aversion for monetary outcomes (Abdellaoui et al., 2007, 2008, 2011b; Booij and van 
de Kuilen, 2009). However, so far loss aversion has not been quantified in the health domain. 
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002) quantitatively investigated loss aversion in health applications, but their 
study did not estimate the parameters of CPT, and, hence, thus far no estimates of loss aversion in 
CPT are available. 
 This lack of investigations is worrying since the assumption of CPT renders various common 
utility elicitation methods invalid (Abdellaoui et al., 2008). Examples include the certainty 
equivalence (CE) method, the standard gamble (SG), and the time tradeoff (TTO) method, which do 
not account for loss aversion and/or probability weighting (Bleichrodt, 2002). These methods are all 
very relevant for health economic evaluations. Hence, methods that elicit the entire function of CPT in 
the health domain are pivotal, both to obtain unbiased estimates of utility of life duration curvature 
and to apply these estimates to correct health state assessment methods, such as the SG and TTO, for 
loss aversion, utility curvature, and probability weighting. For example, Bleichrodt (2002) showed 
that loss aversion exerts an upward bias on health state utilities elicited by SG and TTO, whereas 
utility curvature causes a downward bias on TTO utilities, and underweighting of high probabilities 
often results in SG utilities that are too high. Hence, correcting utility estimates is important in order 
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to reduce the biases present in health state valuation techniques (Abellán-Perpinán et al., 2009a; 
Attema and Brouwer, 2009; Oliver, 2003; Wakker and Stiggelbout, 1995). This research is the first to 
perform such an elicitation, using life duration as an outcome. It involves measuring the utility of life 
duration, the decision weight of probability 1/2, and loss aversion. For this purpose, we use the semi-
parametric method proposed by Abdellaoui et al. (2008) to measure CPT’s parameters for money. 
However, when applying this method to life duration, a number of problems arise. 
 First, health outcomes necessarily involve a time dimension, since health states have a duration 
inextricably bound to them (Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001), whereas monetary outcomes can be 
transferred at a single point in time. Life duration consists of years in the future, with all years 
occurring at different times and, therefore, the utility function for life years is distorted by time 
preferences (Gafni and Torrance, 1984). All future life years are discounted, both those considered 
gains and those considered losses, which is equivalent to a concave utility of life duration function 
(Attema et al., 2012). This discounting is interspersed with common utility properties that are also 
present for monetary outcomes. As a result, the comparison between CPT for money and CPT for 
health is complicated. For example, the utility function for monetary losses is often assumed or found 
to be convex (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
because people tend to be risk seeking for small losses. On the other hand, as shown by Chateauneuf 
and Cohen (1994), risk seeking behavior in the loss domain can also co-exist with a concave utility 
function under CPT, which was indeed found by Abdellaoui et al. (2008). They attributed this to an 
overweighting of the probability of bad outcomes. The concavity caused by discounting of future life 
years implies a further countertendency to convexity resulting from this risk seeking behavior. 
Therefore, individuals may be risk seeking for losses in the health domain, but this can be balanced by 
overweighting probabilities of bad outcomes, as well as discounting of future life years, causing the 
shape of the utility function for losses to be ambiguous. 
 A second problem arising in the health domain is the determination of the location of the RP. 
Laboratory experiments often use small monetary outcomes as their stimuli. A natural RP then is the 
status quo, i.e., just 0, and any money won in the experiment is considered a gain, whereas any money 
that has to be paid to the experimenter will be considered a loss (although the latter is done only 
occasionally for real outcomes). It is, however, not so clear where the RP lies for the type of health 
outcomes that are considered in this study. One could argue that the RP is the expected remaining 
lifetime (e.g., using a mortality table or subjective life expectancy), the lowest outcome (Attema et al., 
2012; Bleichrodt et al., 2001), the sure outcome (van Osch et al., 2004; van Osch and Stiggelbout, 
2008) or the highest outcome in a choice situation, or that it depends on the goals of the respondents 
(van Osch et al., 2006). It is also likely to depend on the decision context and the framing of the 
questions. Hence, the RP is likely to be more heterogeneous among individuals in the health domain 
than in the monetary domain. 
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 It is possible to attempt to estimate the reference point separately for each individual by eliciting 
the point of inflection of the utility function, i.e., the point where the function switches from convex to 
concave (Schmidt and Zank, 2012). Such an approach was performed by Verhoef et al. (1994) for life 
duration. However, they did not formally test where the function was convex and where it was 
concave, but instead assumed it took a logistic shape and estimated this on their CE data. Using the 
obtained coefficients, one can then solve for the inflection point. Alternatively, one can directly elicit 
individual reference points by asking people what the number of remaining life years is such that 
when they life shorter they will consider this a loss, and when they live longer, they consider all years 
beyond that number a gain (Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989). However, this kind of question is not easy 
to answer. One possibility would be to ask respondents for their expected age of death (van Nooten 
and Brouwer, 2004). A hypothetical scenario where they will live longer [shorter] than until this age 
may then be considered a gain [loss]. 
 The location of the RP is essential in estimating the utility functions for gains and losses and loss 
aversion, and, hence, the determination of this location is crucial. Instead of assuming that RP is one 
of the outcomes mentioned in the previous paragraph, or trying to elicit it individually, we attempted 
to induce the RP by explicitly describing it. This RP was subsequently used to measure CPT’s 
functional form. Previous research indicates that such a description indeed causes respondents to 
consider this location as their RP (Robinson et al., 2001). Furthermore, a change in sign of the second 
derivative of the utility function (e.g., from positive [convex] to negative [concave]) may be a genuine 
property for the utility for gains/losses and, therefore, does not necessarily have to indicate the 
reference point.   
 Our results indicate that individuals are risk averse for both gains and losses. We find a concave 
utility function for losses and a close to linear utility function for gains under CPT. Finally, 
individuals are loss averse, with an estimated loss aversion smaller than those found for monetary 
outcomes. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and describes the experimental 
method. Section 3 provides details of the experiment and Section 4 continues with a presentation of 
the results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Method 
 
We let (p,x;y) denote a binary prospect that gives outcome x with probability p and outcome y with 
probability 1-p, with outcomes being real numbers (i.e., life years in the experiment described in 
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Section 3)2. A decision maker’s preference relation  is assumed to be a weak order, i.e., it is 
transitive (if xy and yz, then xz) and complete (either xy, or yx, or both). The relation f  
denotes the asymmetric part of , and ~ denotes indifference. Throughout this paper, we use the 
notation (p,x;y) if x¥y¥0 [xy0, x>0>y] for gain [loss, mixed] prospects. 
 EU evaluates preferences over two-outcome prospects by: 
 
( , ; ) ( ) (1 ) ( ).EU p x y p u x p u y= × + − ×  (1) 
 
However, because of the aforementioned empirical deficiencies of EU, more general specifications 
that incorporate CPT and rank-dependent utility (RDU) have been developed, also in the health 
domain (Bleichrodt and Miyamoto, 2003; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; Bleichrodt and Quiggin, 1997). 
According to CPT, which is a generalization of RDU, the evaluation of prospects becomes (Wakker, 
2010)3: 
 
( )( , ; ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CPT p x y w p u x u y u y+= × − +  (2a) 
for gain prospects; 
 
( )( , ; ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CPT p x y w p u x u y u y−= × − +  (2b) 
for loss prospects, and; 
 
( , ; ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )CPT p x y w p u x w p u y+ −= × + − ×  (2c) 
for mixed prospects. 
 
 An example using one of the questions asked in the experiment may clarify this notation. Let us 
consider j=3 from Table 1 (as explained in Section 3.3). There we have x=15 and y=10 in the gain 
prospect and x=-15 and y=-10 in the loss prospect. Furthermore, these prospects involved p=1/2. 
According to EU the gain prospect will be evaluated by (and likewise for the loss prospect): 
 
  , 15; 10  1/2  15  1/2  10. (1) 
 
According to CPT, the gain prospect will be evaluated by: 
                                               
2
 Our experiment only uses binary prospects and, hence, we do not consider prospects with more than two 
outcomes here. 
3
 Note that CPT (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and original PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) coincide for 
binary prospects. 
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  , 15; 10   

  15  10  10. (2a) 
 
The losses will be evaluated by: 
 
  , 15; 10   

  15  10  10.  (2b) 
 
Finally, suppose we have x=5 and y=-2 in a mixed prospect. This is evaluated by: 
 
  , 5; 2   

  5   

  2. (2c) 
 
 Several studies have proposed methods for measuring the entire CPT function in a monetary 
context. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) and Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) proposed nonparametric 
approaches to measure utility, probability weighting4 and loss aversion under CPT for monetary 
outcomes, making use of gambles, whereas Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Booij et al. (2010) 
used a parametric approach. Instead, Abdellaoui et al. (2008) proposed a semi-parametric approach, 
which was subsequently applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2011b).  
 The CPT function will be measured using an adaptation of the method of Abdellaoui et al. (2008). 
This semi-parametric method uses certainty equivalences (CEs) to elicit the parameter(s) of a 
predetermined parametric utility function. It needs substantially fewer questions and, hence, is 
significantly less time consuming than nonparametric methods (Fox and Poldrack, 2008). 
Furthermore, the different CEs are not susceptible to error propagation, because they are not linked. 
On the other hand, the advantage of this method over a fully parametric method is that it needs not 
make parametric assumptions about probability weighting and, hence, these measurements are not 
confounded by assumptions about the shape of this function (Abdellaoui et al., 2008). 
 The semi-parametric method entails three stages. First, the utility function for gains and the 
decision weight of one probability are simultaneously elicited. This is achieved by eliciting CEs of a 
number of two-outcome prospects. The outcomes of the prospect are changed in this process, whereas 
the probability of obtaining each outcome is the same for all prospects. By assuming CPT and a 
particular parametric shape of the utility function, one can then estimate the parameter(s) and decision 
weight of the fixed probability that best fit the elicited data. Second, the same is done in the loss 
domain. Finally, the value functions for gains and losses are linked by selecting a gain amount within 
the range of values measured in the first step and then, using a mixed prospect, determining the 
                                               
4
 Only Abdellaoui et al. (2007) estimated probability weighting. Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) solely 
estimated utility curvature and loss aversion, and made several assumptions about probability weighting. 
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maximum loss amount such that a subject still prefers the mixed prospect. This allows for estimating 
the loss aversion index, λ, which governs the exchange rate between gain and loss utility units, 
allowing a comparison between utilities of gains and utilities of losses (Köbberling and Wakker, 
2005). In particular, we follow Köbberling and Wakker (2005) and Abdellaoui et al. (2008) in 
assuming that observable utility U is a composition of λ and a basic utility u, with: 
 
    !"  # 0$!"  % 0& (3) 
 
According to this quantification, an individual is classified as loss averse, i.e. giving more weight to 
utility units in the loss domain than the same absolute utilities in the gain domain, if λ>1. 
  
 2.1. Utility and decision weight elicitation 
 
The utility elicitation is similar to that of Abdellaoui et al. (2008, S.2.1) except that we consider the 
exponential family for utility of gains and losses. The advantage of the exponential family in our 
study is that it elicits utility independently of the RP. That is, the parameter estimates will be 
independent from the location of the RP5. 
 The exponential family (characterized by constant absolute risk aversion) was defined by u(x)=[1-
exp(-γx)]/γ for gains and u(x)=[exp(δx)-1]/δ for losses, with γ,δ∫0. For γ,δ=0, it was defined by 
u(x)=x. For gains, the exponential function is concave if γ>0, convex if γ<0, and linear if γ=0. For 
losses, it is concave if δ<0, convex if δ>0 and linear if δ=0.  
 For each prospect i in the gain (loss) domain, we elicit a CEi such that the respondent is indifferent 
between gaining (losing) CEi years for certain and the prospect that provides a 50% chance of gaining  
(losing) a higher amount xi and 50% chance of gaining (losing) a lower amount yi. If the respondent’s 
preferences can be represented by CPT and the exponential utility function, this indifference can be 
evaluated in the gain domain by the following equation: 
 
'() *+,-
*  .  
'() */-
* 
'() *0-
*  
'() *0-
*  (4) 
 
                                               
5
 This follows from the mathematical properties of this model: it implies that future life years are discounted at a 
constant rate; hence, the distance from an outcome to the reference point does not matter, as the per-period 
discount rate is the same for all periods. The only change, therefore, is that the value of γ has to be rescaled, 
whereas the decision weight and goodness of fit do not change.  
 9
where ω+=w+(1/2). Solving this expression for CEi gives us a regression equation that enables the 
simultaneous estimation of the utility function parameter γ and the decision weight ω+ through 
nonlinear least squares: 
 
1   234
5'()*/-6/7*0-6/7*0-
*  (5) 
 
The procedure for estimating utility and decision weight is similar in the loss domain, giving the 
following regression equation that enables the simultaneous estimation of the utility function 
parameter δ and the decision weight ω- through nonlinear least squares: 
 
1  234
8'()9/-6/790-6/790-
9  (6) 
 
  
 2.2. Loss aversion elicitation 
  
The loss aversion index λ could be simultaneously estimated by selecting two of the elicited CEis for 
gains, G*, and determining the loss L* for which the subject was indifferent between a prospect 
giving a 50% chance of gaining G* and a 50% chance of losing L*, and the status quo: (pg,G*;L*)~0 
(i.e., a mixed prospect). This gives: 
 
ω
+u(G*) + ω- λ u(L*) = 0 (7) 
 
In terms of the exponential utility function, this translates into: 
 
ω
+ '() *:;* + ω-  λ  
'()9<;
9  = 0 (8) 
 
 
The mixed prospect, when solving for L*, results in the following regression equation: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
δ
γδλωγω /*)exp(11ln
*
×−−×−
=
−+ G
L   (9) 
 
3. Experiment 
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 3.1. Subjects 
 
The subjects were 80 undergraduate students in business administration at Erasmus University 
Rotterdam. They received course credits for their participation.  
 
3.2. Procedure 
 
The experiment was run on computers, in sessions with 4 respondents and 1 experimenter. The 
subjects were separated by partitions and did not communicate with each other. They could consult 
the experimenter in case of questions. It was made clear to them that there were no right or wrong 
answers. Each task of the experiment started with instructions on the computer screen and two 
practice questions. Printed instructions were also handed out, so that subjects could always verify 
something, or read these instead of the electronic instructions if they did not like to read them from 
the screen. The experiment lasted 30 minutes on average, including reading the instructions and 
performing the practice questions. A translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix 1. 
 The indifferences were elicited by means of a series of binary choices, because previous research 
has found that inferring indifferences from a set of choices results in fewer inconsistencies than when 
asking subjects directly for their indifference values (Bostic et al., 1990). A subject could return to a 
previous question if (s)he made a mistake. 
 A subject had to choose one of two prospects in the CE task, where the left option was always 
riskless. We included a consistency test by repeating the second or third iteration for some randomly 
selected questions at the end of an iteration sequence. For the mixed prospects, we repeated the third 
iteration at the end of one iteration sequence. 
 
 3.3. Stimuli 
 
The utility functions for both gains and losses were elicited by the use of 7 CE questions each. It was 
made clear to the subjects that they should imagine living 30 more years in full health, after which 
they would die. Hence, we induced an RP of living 30 more years. 
 In the gain part, the subjects then had to determine which of two drugs, each of which could 
increase their life beyond 30 years, they would choose if they were in this situation. The riskless 
prospect contained a drug that would increase lifetime with CEi years for certain, whereas the risky 
option involved a drug that would have 50% chance of gaining x years and a 50% chance of gaining y 
years, with 0y<CEi<x. All life extensions were spent in full health. 
 In the loss part subjects were instructed to imagine that they had no other option than to take a 
drug because of a disease that would decrease their remaining lifetime (or at best remain the same). 
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Now, the riskless prospect contained a drug that would decrease lifetime with CEi years for certain, 
whereas the risky option involved a drug that would have 50% chance of losing x years and a 50% 
chance of losing y years, with 0¥y>CEi>x. 
 The stimuli of the prospects of these questions are shown in Table 1. The amounts of gains and 
losses ranged between 0 and 20 years. Because remaining lifetime obviously cannot become negative, 
the maximum possible loss amount was 30. Moreover, since the possibility of immediate death has 
been shown to create distortions in previous studies (Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986), it was preferable to have a maximum loss amount smaller than 30 years; hence we chose a 
maximum loss of 20 years.  
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
 We used only one probability (p=1/2), since Abdellaoui et al. (2008) found no significant 
differences between utilities obtained for p=1/2 and p=1/3, allowing a substantial reduction of 
cognitive burden. The order of the elicitation of the CEs was random. The order of the gain and loss 
parts was also randomized, although these parts were not interspersed. The latter would require more 
cognitive effort from the subjects, because they would then repeatedly have to change perspective 
from gains to losses, and vice versa, which would likely threaten data reliability. 
 Two elicitations were included to allow for estimation of the loss aversion index. Abdellaoui et al. 
(2008) used six estimations for this purpose, but found no significant differences between them, 
suggesting that one elicitation is sufficient to obtain reliable estimates. However, because in this study 
we used another domain and loss aversion indexes tend to be variable (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; 
Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Bleichrodt et al., 2001; Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009; Schmidt and Traub, 
2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), two elicitations were included to account for robustness. We 
determined L* such that ( ) 0~;,21 ** jj LG , for j=2,4, where j stands for the number of the prospect in 
Table 1. That is, the subject could choose between maintaining the RP, or taking a gamble with 50% 
chance of gaining G* years and 50% chance of losing L years, where L was varied until the subject 
was about indifferent at L*. The order of j was random. 
 
 3.4. Analysis 
 
A subject was classified as risk averse [risk seeking] if at least 5 out of 7 CE questions produced a risk 
averse [seeking] answer (i.e., a CE lower [higher] than the expected value of the prospect)6. This 
                                               
6
 To allow for response error in elicited CE, we defined risk neutrality with a +/-5% error margin around the 
expected value. Weakly risk averse or weakly risk seeking responses might therefore be classified as risk neutral 
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allowed taking into account response error. Because the data were not normally distributed, we 
performed nonparametric statistical tests (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for within-subjects analyses 
and Mann-Whitney tests for between-subjects analyses). Two-tailed p-values are reported. 
 
4. Results 
 
 4.1. Reliability 
 
Seven subjects were excluded because they did not understand (one of) the tasks. The replication of 
the second iteration led to the same choice as the initial question in 96.6% [85.6%] of the cases for 
gains [losses], indicating a good reliability. The replication of the third iteration led to the same choice 
in 88.3% [86.3%, 90.4%] of the cases for gains [losses, mixed prospects]. A lower reliability for the 
third iteration than for the second iteration was to be expected, since the stimulus value was likely to 
be closer to the CE there. For losses, however, the reliabilities were similar for the second and third 
iteration. These reliabilities are comparable to those of earlier studies (Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Stott, 
2006). 
 For some CE questions, the order of the gain and loss parts turned out to have a (marginally) 
significant effect. In particular, subjects who answered the gain questions first had lower median CEs 
for all 7 questions in the gain part than those who started with the loss questions, of which 3 were 
(marginally) significant (CE1, CE3, and CE7: p=0.055, p<0.01, and p=0.025, respectively). This 
implies that the former group was more risk averse in the gain part. An explanation for this order 
effect may be that subjects who started with the loss questions were more inclined to ‘gamble’ in the 
gain questions, because then all outcomes were ‘indeed positive’, i.e., all outcomes were at least better 
than the loss outcomes they faced before. Such a distinction was not found in the loss part, where 
neither systematic nor significant differences were found between the two groups (for 5 CEs, the 
medians were equal, whilst it was higher [lower] for the group starting with loss questions for CE4 
[CE5], all p’s>0.10). The observation of higher risk aversion for gains for subjects starting with the 
gain part highlights the importance of randomizing the order of the gain and loss parts; our data signal 
the presence of significant order effects7. 
  
 4.2. CEs and risk attitude 
                                                                                                                                                  
responses. As a consequence, our classification result can be interpreted as a conservative estimate of the 
amount of risk aversion or risk seeking. 
7
 Pinto-Prades et al. (2009) also found significant order effects in the case of willingness to pay (WTP) for 
health improvements, where WTP was lower if they started with the lowest health gain.  
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The median answers to the CE questions, as well as their interquartile ranges, are shown in Table 2. 
This table shows a clear tendency of risk aversion, both for gains and for losses. Overall, 54.8% 
[38.2%, 7.0%] of the responses were consistent with risk aversion [risk neutrality, risk seeking] for 
gains, whilst for losses these percentages were 51.9%, 41.7%, and 6.4%, respectively. Comparing 
each CE for gains with its counterpart for losses, we found 36.8% [26.4%] to reflect risk aversion 
[risk neutrality] for both. Furthermore, 10.6% [14.3%] of the CEs was risk neutral [averse] for gains 
and risk averse [neutral] for losses. 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
 The classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude for gains and losses is presented in Table 3, 
and shows a similar picture as the one derived from the individual responses. No subject was 
classified as risk seeking, neither for gains nor for losses. The largest group consisted of subjects who 
were risk averse over the whole domain (24.7%). The other classifications were also similar to the 
classification according to the stand alone answers to the separate questions, although there were 
somewhat more mixed subjects for losses than for gains. The proportion of risk averse subjects did 
not significantly differ from the proportion of risk neutral subjects, neither for gains nor for losses 
(p>0.22). 
 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
 There was a high degree of risk aversion in the mixed prospects, especially for j=4 (Table 1). The 
median size of the loss establishing indifference varied between 0.46 and 0.79 of the size of the 
corresponding median gain (j=2: G*=3.85, L*=3.05; j=4: G*=8.50, L*=3.95). In total, 77.4% of the 
responses were risk averse. 48 subjects were risk averse in both mixed prospects, 8 were risk seeking, 
and 17 were classified as mixed. This degree of risk aversion was comparable to the degree of risk 
aversion in the gain prospects. 
 
 4.3. Utility for gains and losses 
 
Table 4 shows the median parameters of the exponential model, based on the individual data. The 
median coefficient was significantly different from 0 for gains (γ=0.25, p=0.03) and losses (δ=-1.24, 
p<0.01). The coefficients were significantly different between gains and losses (p<0.01). Figure 1 in 
Appendix 2 shows the distribution of individual utility parameters. 
 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
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 Table 5 gives subjects’ classifications based on their estimated utility parameters. The most 
common pattern was concave utility for both gains and losses. It turns out that the risk aversion for 
gains was to a large degree due to probability underweighting; whereas, the utility function was 
indeed less concave than would be suggested when assuming EU. 
 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
 4.4. Loss aversion 
 
We found evidence for loss aversion (λ=1.18). The median of the individual loss aversion indexes 
was significantly different from 1 (p=0.03). The interquartile range indicated a considerable amount 
of variation at the individual level, as is common in studies of loss aversion (Abdellaoui et al., 2008; 
2011b). At the individual level, classifying individuals as loss averse if their median loss aversion 
index exceeded 1, 44 of the 73 subjects (60.3%) met this criterion. This proportion was higher than 
the proportion of gain seeking subjects (39.7%, p<0.01). Figure 1 in Appendix 2 shows the 
distribution of individual loss aversion indexes. 
 
 4.5. Probability weighting 
 
We found significant weighting of probability 1/2, but only in the gain domain. There was 
pronounced underweighting of probability 1/2 for gains (median ω+=0.46, p=0.01). For losses, the 
decision weight of probability 1/2 did not significantly differ from 1/2 (median ω-=0.49, p=0.77). The 
weight was significantly higher for losses than for gains (p=0.03). Consistent with previous evidence, 
decision weights for losses departed much less from linearity than those for gains (Abdellaoui, 2000; 
Booij et al., 2010). 
 
 4.6. Expected utility 
 
We reran the analysis assuming EU. Under EU, linear weighting of probabilities is imposed and the 
decision maker treats all outcomes as gains. Since the latter assumption removes any differences 
between gain, loss and mixed prospects, we also performed this analysis using the pooled gain, loss 
and mixed data. As can already be inferred from the data presented in Table 1, the responses indicated 
a high degree of risk aversion for both gains and losses. Hence, the above analysis makes clear that 
underweighting of probability 1/2 captures all of the risk aversion for gains. We would therefore 
expect concave utility functions, since risk attitude is entirely captured by utility curvature in EU. The 
results shown in Table 6 indeed confirm this prediction; the median utility function becomes concave 
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(p<0.01). This illustrates that erroneously neglecting probability weighting leads to distorted 
estimations of utility. 
 
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
 4.7. Analysis assuming RP=0 
 
One explanation for our finding of risk aversion for both gain and loss prospects is that subjects may 
indeed have treated all outcomes as gains (i.e., they may have taken their RP to be 0 life years). In 
order to test whether this could be a feasible explanation, we reanalyzed the data under this 
assumption, which corresponds to the RDU model initially proposed by Quiggin (1982). As in the EU 
case, this entailed considering the total life expectancies instead of the deviations from a life 
expectancy of 30 years. Since this assumption removed any differences between gain and loss 
prospects, we performed this analysis using the pooled gain and loss data.8  
 Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. Unsurprisingly, we found utility to be less curved than 
utility under EU (p<0.01). The difference between the results under CPT and under RDU lies in the 
fact that probability weighting captures a part of risk attitudes through probabilistic risk attitudes (i.e., 
underweighting or overweighting of probabilities). We found evidence for underweighting of 
probability 1/2 (median ω=0.44, p<0.01). 
  The nested nature of the three models allows for carrying out statistical tests to compare the 
various theories. CPT is a generalization of RDU, which is itself a generalization of EU. Then EU is 
nested within RDU, which is nested within CPT. Using this nested structure we performed likelihood 
ratio tests at the individual level to determine which model better accounted for the data. EU 
performed better than RDU for 16 out of the 73 subjects. Hence, it is worth using an RDU model 
rather than a simple EU model to account for attitude towards life years. When compared with CPT, 
we found RDU to better fit the data in only one case. Then, assuming RP=0 did not bring any 
improvement in the analysis when compared to both the standard EU-QALY model and CPT. When 
compared to CPT, EU explained the data better for only one subject.9 Therefore, taking into account 
sign-dependence through CPT rather than assuming EU or RDU greatly increased the explanatory 
power of the model.  
  
                                               
8
 Alternatively, the reference point may be the highest outcome, 50, implying all outcomes are treated as losses. 
However, given the irrelevance of the location of the RP in the exponential utility function, this would give the 
same results as when RP=0. 
9
 Standard measures of goodness of fit, like the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion lead to similar results. 
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5. Discussion 
 
This paper provides the first quantitative estimation of an index of loss aversion in the health domain, 
in addition to estimates of utility of life duration and decision weights. Our study adds new evidence 
to the debate about transferability of utility between domains, which is ongoing (Abellán-Perpinán et 
al., 2009b; Wakker, 1994). We found significant loss aversion, with coefficients of lower magnitude 
than those reported in studies on loss aversion for monetary outcomes (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; 2008; 
Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009). Moreover, our finding of risk aversion over the entire domain of 
study is not in agreement with diminishing sensitivity as commonly observed in the monetary domain. 
In particular, our results suggest that a convex utility function for losses is not a universal 
phenomenon. Instead, the shape of this function may well depend on the outcome domain, as well as 
the magnitude of the stimuli. 
 
 5.1. Loss aversion 
  
We observed more loss aversion in the mixed prospect with the higher gain than in the mixed prospect 
with the lower gain. The median answers to these questions suggest that respondents may have had a 
maximum number in their mind that they were prepared to risk losing. As a result, the loss aversion 
index is predicted to be positively correlated to the gain amount in the mixed prospect. This prediction 
is at odds with the usual assumption of constant loss aversion (Bleichrodt et al., 2001; Köbberling and 
Wakker, 2005; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), and also rejects empirical evidence found for 
qualitative data in the health domain, which suggested that loss aversion decreases with life duration 
(Attema and Brouwer, 2012; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). Therefore, more 
detailed research into the relationship between loss aversion and outcome magnitudes is called for. 
 
 5.2. Utility 
 
Our results regarding risk aversion for gains are similar to those of previous studies (Abdellaoui, 
2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2008). An interesting finding is that weighting of probability 1/2 importantly 
explains this risk aversion, utility for gains being close to linear. Our results for losses also confirm 
those of Abdellaoui et al. (2008), who reported concave utility as well, although they did not observe 
risk aversion for losses as we do. The reason for this is that they find underweighting of the 
probability of the worst outcome for losses. Instead, we find slight overweighting of this probability10, 
which implies, as demonstrated in Section 4.6, that utility would be even more concave had we not 
accounted for probability weighting. It seems, therefore, that our subjects did not weight probabilities 
                                               
10
 A similar result was observed by Booij et al. (2010). 
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much in the loss domain, implying their risk aversion in this domain is indeed due to concave utility; 
whereas, they were pessimists with regard to probabilities in the gain domain, explaining much of 
their risk averse behavior there.  
 Nevertheless, most studies in this field found a concave utility function for gains (Stiggelbout et 
al., 1994), even when controlling for probability weighting (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; Bleichrodt 
and Pinto, 2000; Wakker and Deneffe, 1996), or when using a riskless domain, not susceptible to 
probability weighting (Abellán-Perpinán et al., 2006; Attema et al., 2012). Verhoef et al. (1994) found 
that a logistic utility function provided a good fit to their data, claiming the transition from convex to 
concave utility occurred at an aspiration level that could be regarded as the reference point, and, 
hence, concluded the convexity occurred on the loss side and the concavity on the gains side. 
However, this conclusion could not be verified by other evidence. 
 We are aware of only one study that observed convex utility of life duration for gains (Knoph 
Kvamme et al., 2010). This study reported convex utility for small life extensions using a willingness 
to pay approach. However, a horizon of at most 1 year was used, whereas the other studies, as well as 
our study, used a much larger time horizon. Knoph Kvamme et al. (2010) attributed their finding to a 
threshold effect, but this is not likely for our gain amount of maximally 20 years. Furthermore, 
Attema et al. (2012) reported a concave utility of life duration function in a riskless environment, and 
also found concavity for results obtained with a CE method, even after correcting for the median 
probability weighting estimates obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  
 
 5.3. Explanations 
  
Several explanations can be offered for our findings regarding the utility function for losses. First, it 
should be kept in mind that prospect theory was originally proposed to explain choices among 
lotteries involving monetary outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and empirical studies 
reporting convex utility for losses indeed typically used small amounts of such outcomes. Therefore, 
it is not at all clear that the use of life years should also generate convex utility for losses. If remaining 
life expectancy is very small, the situation may instead be comparable to that of being near ‘ruin’. 
Researchers tend to agree that utility for losses gets concave near ruin for money (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Laughhunn et al., 1980; Libby and Fishburn, 1977; Marquis and Holmer, 1996; Ogaki 
and Zhang, 2001), so if loss of life duration is like ‘ruin’, it becomes more natural to observe concave 
utility. 
 An alternative explanation for the concave utility function may be that time preference generates 
enough concavity to more than offset the convexity due to diminishing sensitivity. There is reason to 
doubt this possibility, however, because if it were true, this would suggest more concavity for gains 
than for losses. Indeed, we find the opposite, and very little concavity for gains when adjusting for 
probability weighting. 
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 Third, our decision problem may be perceived as a situation of a delayed resolution of uncertainty 
(Abdellaoui et al., 2011a). That is, subjects may have considered the gain prospects as uncertain 
during the 30-year reference duration, and after that they would ‘learn’ the resolution of uncertainty 
(e.g., either no gain and, hence, death after those 30 years, or a gain and some additional years). The 
situation becomes radically different for loss prospects under this reasoning. For example, prospect 
j=4 could give either a loss of 20 years or no loss at all. If the bad outcome then occurs, the resolution 
of uncertainty will happen after 10 years already. Consequently, the risk aversion in the loss domain 
may be the result of the interaction between discounting, uncertainty, and the timing of resolution of 
uncertainty. A similar reasoning applies to mixed prospects, where the situation actually gets even 
more complicated, because there the subject’s response determines what the timing of resolution of 
uncertainty will be. Hence, it becomes endogenous and subject-specific. 
 A fourth explanation is that subjects may have regarded zero remaining life years as their RP, and, 
hence, may not have considered any outcome as a loss. However, the findings of loss aversion and 
significant differences between the utility curvatures for gains and losses indicate that subjects are 
sensitive to framing of questions as either gains or losses, and do not treat all outcomes as gains, or, if 
they do, do not treat all gains similarly. 
 Finally, a possible explanation entails that people took the sure outcome as their RP. This would 
imply that they have considered all prospects, both in the gain part, the loss part, and the mixed part, 
as mixed. A problem that arises if this were indeed the case, however, is that the analysis becomes 
considerably more complicated. If respondents treat all prospects as mixed, each decision involves 
five different parameters (i.e., the utility curvature parameters and the decision weights for both gains 
and losses, and the loss aversion index). Furthermore, the RP is not exogenous anymore, but equals 
the CE which differs between subjects depending on their choices. As a result, a collinearity problem 
arises in the statistical analysis, making regression impossible. More research with a study design 
developed to explicitly deal with this issue is therefore warranted. 
 
 5.4. Limitations 
 
The design of our study had several limitations. First, our assumption of exponential utility implies a 
constant discount rate, whilst empirical evidence suggests constant discounting does not always hold 
(Attema, 2012; Frederick et al., 2002). However, we also fitted the power utility function, which gave 
a similar goodness of fit11, and, as explained earlier, the exponential model provides several 
advantages over the power model. On the other hand, our results do not allow giving a conclusion 
regarding the relevance of the location of the reference point, which does not matter according to 
                                               
11
 Results under the assumption of power utility are available upon request to the authors. 
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exponential utility, but does according to power utility. Further research addressing this question is 
therefore needed. 
 Second, we could not separately estimate the utility function and the decision weight of 
probability 1/2, but had to estimate them simultaneously. This may give estimates that are to some 
extent arbitrary. For example, the assumption of exponential utility produces lower estimates of the 
degree of underweighting of probability 1/2 than the assumption of power utility.  
 Third, our sample consisted of a student population, and, hence, our findings cannot readily be 
extended to the general public. However, the use of such a convenience sample is common in this 
field (Abdellaoui et al., 2007, 2008; Oliver, 2003; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and existing 
empirical evidence suggests there are no systematic differences with more representative samples 
(Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009; Booij et al., 2010). 
 Finally, since we used only one single probability in our two-outcome prospects (i.e., 1/2), our 
study does not provide any evidence on the decision weights attached to other probabilities. In 
particular, we know that people heavily transform very small and large probabilities (Abdellaoui, 
2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). This finding is especially relevant for the 
SG method, which is frequently used in health economics studies and often involves very small 
probabilities of extreme outcomes, such as immediate death (Oliver, 2003; van Osch et al., 2004). 
Hence, we recommend an extension of our study that implements different probabilities as a useful 
topic for future research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that results presented in this study suggest that the EU assumptions underlying the 
standard QALY model are not valid, justifying the use of non-EU QALY models. Furthermore, our 
results indicate that loss aversion plays a role also in decision making in the health domain, but it 
appears not to be constant. Finally, a concave utility function was observed for both gains and losses, 
rejecting the concept of diminishing sensitivity. The most notable finding of our study is the absence 
of risk seeking behavior in the loss domain. This highlights the need for more research to investigate 
whether this result was due to the health domain causing fundamentally different behavior than the 
monetary domain, or was caused by the specific methodology used here. 
 This first attempt to quantify the functional form of CPT in the health domain seems promising, 
but highlights that several hurdles still have to be taken. First, more investigation into the shape of the 
utility function is required to confirm the large decrease in concavity of the utility function for gains 
when accounting for probability weighting. Preferably, this should be done while separately 
measuring utility curvature and probability weighting, in order to better disentangle these two 
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concepts. Second, more research is required to further investigate the precise influence of time 
preference; in particular regarding its ability to explain the observed risk averse behavior in the loss 
domain. Our findings of more concavity in the loss domain than in the gain domain suggest that time 
preference may not be the only phenomenon that should be considered. Third, the location of the RP 
in the health domain deserves further exploration. This location is less obvious for health outcomes 
than for monetary outcomes, and plays a crucial role in CPT. Finally, an extension of this study to a 
more representative sample of the general population would be worthwhile. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Stimuli of the gain and loss prospects 
 
 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6 j=7 
x
 5 10 15 20 20 20 20 
y
 0 0 10 0 5 10 15 
 
 
Table 2. Median CEs (interquartile ranges in parentheses) 
 
CE Gains Losses 
1 2.25 (1.90-2.25) 2.75 (2.75-3.25) 
2 3.85 (3.85-4.60) 5.75 (5.25-6.75) 
3 12.25 (11.90-12.25) 12.75 (12.75-13.75) 
4 8.50 (5.50-9.50) 13 (11.50-15.50) 
5 10.50 (8.50-11.50) 13.50 (12.50-15.50) 
6 14.25 (13.25-14.75) 15.75 (15.25-16.50) 
7 17.25 (16.63-17.75) 17.75 (17.75-18.10) 
 
 
Table 3. Classification according to CEs 
 
 Losses      
  Risk averse Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
seeking 
Mixed Total 
Gains Risk averse 18 0 0 8 26 
 Risk 
neutral 
0 5 0 2 7 
 Risk 
seeking 
0 0 0 0 0 
 Mixed 9 12 0 19 40 
 Total 27 17 0 29 73 
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Table 4. Estimation results, based on individual data 
 
 γ ω
+
 
δ ω - λ 
 Median 0.25 0.46 -1.24 0.49 1.18  
IQR -0.49-1.91 0.36-0.56 -2.77- -0.27 0.43-0.59 0.76-1.83 
 
 
Table 5. Classifications according to utility functions 
 
Losses 
 Concave Convex Total 
Gains Concave 34 8 42 
Convex 23 8 30 
Total 56 16 73 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation results under EU and RDU 
 
 EU RDU 
 Utility 
parameter 
Utility 
parameter 
ω
+
 
Median 2.28 0.95 0.44 
IQR 1.20-3.70 -0.68-3.51 0.37-0.49 
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Appendix 1: Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Welcome at this experiment on decision making regarding quality of life and life duration. We would 
like to emphasize that we are only interested in your preference, so there are no right or wrong 
answers! 
 
The experiment consists of eight parts. Each part will be preceded by instructions about the task. 
These instructions will be appear on your screen, but you can also find them in the instruction set on 
your desk. To find out whether you have understood everything, we start each part with a couple of 
practice questions. Take your time to read and consider the questions carefully. You have enough time 
and there won’t be a problem to finish the task within an hour. If you have any questions or remarks, 
don’t hesitate to consult the leader of the experiment. 
 
Good luck!
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Gain Prospects 
 
Imagine you have 30 remaining years to live in full health. After that, you get a fatal disease, causing 
an immediate, painless death. However, recently, 2 drugs have been invented to do something about 
this. First, a drug (Drug A) is available that will extend your life 12 years, in full health. If you take 
this drug, this means that you have 42 remaining life years in full health, after which you still die of 
the aforementioned fatal disease. You have to take the drug only once and it has no side-effects. 
Second, a drug (Drug B) was invented that may extend your life 24 years in full health, meaning you 
would have 54 remaining life years in full health. However, it is not sure that this will happen. Drug B 
will be effective for half of the people, but not for the other half. There are no consequences for the 
people for whom Drug B is not effective. They will still live 30 more years in full health, as in the 
baseline situation. One cannot predict beforehand in whom Drug B strikes and in whom not. Striking 
or not depends solely on chance and, hence, has nothing to do with any personal features of the drug 
user. Therefore, the chance that this drug will be effective for you is, as for any other person, exactly 
50%. One can imagine here, for instance, that one tosses a fair coin, giving one 10 extra years if heads 
comes up, and 0 extra years if tails comes up. 50% chance therefore means a chance of 1 out of 2 (or 
50 out of 100). Drug B neither has any side-effect. 
 
The question to you is to choose one of the two drugs, because you can only take one. When you have 
taken one, the other one won’t have any effect anymore. If you take Drug A, you will live exactly 42 
more years in full health for sure. If you take Drug B, you have a 50% chance to gain 24 years and, 
thus, live 54 more years, but also a 50% chance to gain nothing and live 30 more years in full health. 
Immediately after taking Drug B, the doctor can determine whether the drug is effective or not. Once 
this is known, one cannot change the situation. Assume no new drugs will be developed to change 
your situation. 
 
In the following questions the scenario will be the same as in the instructions presented here, except 
for the number of remaining years to be lived. 
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 Drug A Drug B 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Gain 
12 
years
Gain 
24 
years
Gain 
0 
years
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Loss Prospects 
 
Imagine that initially you would have 30 remaining years to live in full health. After that, you would 
get a fatal disease, causing an immediate, painless death. Suddenly, however, you get another disease 
right now, forcing you to choose between 2 drugs. Both drugs cause you to stay fully healthy, but do 
shorten your remaining life duration (or have a chance to shorten it). 
First, there is a drug (Drug A) available that shortens your life by 7 years. If you take this drug, you 
therefore have 23 remaining years of life in full health, after which you will die. You only have to 
take the drug once and it does not have any side-effects. 
Second, there is a drug (Drug B) available that may shorten your life by 14 years, which would imply 
a remaining life time of 16 years in full health. It is, however, not certain that this will happen. For 
half of the people, drug B will shorten the life duration by 14 years, but not for the other half; the 
latter have the luck that Drug B does not shorten their remaining life duration. They will live 30 more 
years in full health, as in the baseline situation.  
One cannot predict beforehand in whom Drug B shortens life duration. Shortening life duration or not 
depends solely on chance and, hence, has nothing to do with any personal features of the drug user. 
Therefore, the chance that Drug B will shorten you life duration, as for any other person, exactly 50%. 
One can imagine here, for instance, that one tosses a fair coin, giving one 14 fewer years if heads 
comes up, and 0 fewer years if tails comes up. 50% chance therefore means a chance of 1 out of 2 (or 
50 out of 100). Drug B neither has any side-effect. 
 
The question to you is to choose one of the two drugs, because you have to take one. If you take Drug 
A, you will live exactly 7 years shorter than in the initial situation, namely exactly 23 years in full 
health. If you take Drug B, you have a 50% chance to die 14 years earlier, and, thus, live 16 more 
years in full health, but also a 50% chance to lose nothing and live 30 more years in full health. 
Immediately after taking Drug B, the doctor can determine whether the drug is effective or not. Once 
this is known, one cannot change the situation. Assume no new drugs will be developed to change 
your situation. 
 
In the following questions the scenario will be the same as in the instructions presented here, except 
for the number of remaining years to be lived. 
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 Drug A Drug B 
                      
Lose 
7 
years
Lose 
0 
years
Lose 
14 
years
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Mixed Prospects 
 
Imagine you have 30 remaining years to live in full health. After that, you get a fatal disease, causing 
an immediate, painless death. However, recently, a drug has been invented to do something about this. 
This drug may extend your life by a specific number of years, in full health. If you take this drug, this 
means that you have more than 30 remaining life years in full health, after which you still die of the 
aforementioned fatal disease. You have to take the drug only once and it has no side-effects. 
However, it is not sure that this will happen. The drug will be effective for half of the people, but not 
for the other half. The remaining life duration will be less than 30 years, in full health, for the people 
for whom Drug B does not strike. One cannot predict beforehand in whom the drug strikes and in 
whom not. Striking or not depends solely on chance and, hence, has nothing to do with any personal 
features of the drug user. Therefore, the chance that this drug will be effective for you is, as for any 
other person, exactly 50%. 
 
The question to you is whether you want to take the drug or not. In case you don’t take the drug, you 
will live exactly 30 more years in full health for sure. If you do take the drug, you have a 50% chance 
to gain a number of years and, thus, live more than 30 years, but also a 50% chance to lose life years 
and live less than 30 years in full health. Immediately after taking the drug, the doctor can determine 
whether the drug strikes or not. Once this is known, one cannot change the situation.  
 
       
      No drug   Drug 
 
Neither 
a gain 
nor a 
loss
Lose Y 
years
Gain X 
years
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Appendix 2: Individual results 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of individual parameters. Left panel: distributions 
of utility parameters for gains (black line) and losses (blue line). Right panel: distribution of loss 
aversion indexes. 
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